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The dominant ethnic moment
Towards the abolition of ‘whiteness’?
ERIC KAUFMANN
Birkbeck College, University of London, UK
INTRODUCTION
In the past decade and a half, the study of the American white majority has
blossomed into a major academic endeavour. So-called ‘White Studies’
provided an important service in opening up a ‘hidden’ field of study that
remained neglected as recently as the early 1990s. However, in this debate,
I suggest that while the study of whites and white racial systems is import-
ant, the White Studies approach possesses little heuristic value for scholars
attempting to explain majority responses to multicultural politics. ‘White-
ness’ is a colloquial term used by local actors to describe the lived reality
of dominant ethnicity as it appears from the ‘inside’ of American society.
Scholars should be more critical, comparative and discerning than their
subjects: ‘white’ is the particular racial boundary marker that distinguishes
dominant ethnic groups from subaltern ones in a small proportion of the
world’s nations. Whiteness informs, but does not constitute, dominant
ethnicity and we should not mistake the content of group boundary markers
for the essentials. Particular cultural markers are neither necessary nor
sufficient conditions for ethnicity.
The position I advance goes further, claiming that White Studies suffers
from a number of serious flaws that should lead us to question whether this
approach can continue to advance the frontiers of knowledge in the wider
sphere of ethnic and racial studies. These flaws include: (1) a constructivism
that fails to recognize the cognitive and social processes that underpin
social ‘reality’; (2) an excessive emphasis on ethnic boundaries as opposed
to ethnic narratives, thereby overstating the degree of malleability
possible in ethnic identity; (3) a tacit belief in white exceptionalism, which
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overemphasizes the ideological character of whiteness and deifies whites;
(4) an elision of dominant ethnicity and race; and (5) a threefold parochial-
ism in terms of place, time horizon and the role of race in ethnic studies.
The first four flaws lead to problematic interpretations of the American
context, while the final omission greatly hinders the usefulness of the white-
ness paradigm outside the United States. This article therefore begins by
examining the American case and then moves to consider the international
arena.
An alternative to White Studies that avoids its pitfalls and helps us to
better comprehend the rising sociopolitical forces of our time is the
emerging study of dominant ethnicity. Grounded in a less reductionist, more
international and more nuanced analytical context, I believe the dominant
ethnicity approach provides the best way forward for understanding
majority-group and dominant minority movements. Dominant ethnicity
cannot encompass everything, and needs to be complemented by a racial
studies perspective that can address problems that lie beyond the scope of
ethnic studies. However, I contend that the study of dominant ethnicity
provides the most useful perspective for understanding the recent upsurge
in anti-multicultural politics in the West.
Social construction
This article takes a critical realist approach (Bhaskar, 1978; Archer, 1995;
Bader, 2001: 252) as its starting point, and stresses the importance of
mutually understood concepts for the advancement of human knowledge.
This approach rejects the use of subjects’ constructions as the basis for
scholarly categories unless those constructions afford us a useful way of
understanding social reality. Our social reality is ultimately constructed by
the way we process sense-impressions, but it is a fallacy to move from this
accurate observation to the post-structuralist conceit that concepts are
simply power-driven paradigms without empirical referent. Physicists have
shown that the colour spectrum is simply a continuum of wavelength with
no natural breaks. Yet anthropologists have shown remarkable cross-
cultural agreement over colour. We all have a name for ‘blue’ as a colour in
a way that we do not for ‘blue-green’ (Dawkins, 2004: 31). Much the same
could be said about many objects from trees to chairs.
Does the same cross-cultural ‘auto-focus’ apply to concepts like ethnic-
ity or race? Clearly not, or we would not face problems of contested
concepts. On the other hand, the wide degree of social scientific agreement
over concepts that prevents us from publishing ethnic studies articles in the
American Economic Review illustrates that we agree on far more than we
care to acknowledge. The question, therefore, is the degree to which the
social world represents a break with that of the natural. Elsewhere, I claim
that there is no complete break, but rather a gradation of conceptual
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fuzziness that increases as one moves from the ‘hardest’ of natural sciences
to, say, literary criticism (Kaufmann, 1999). In terms of scholarly concepts
in our field, I am relatively optimistic: there is a sound empirical substrate
of auto-constructed reality with which to work.
Let us be more specific. In this debate, I use the term ‘ethnic group’ or
ethnie to refer to a named, imagined, human community, many of whose
members believe in a myth of shared ancestry and place of origin (Smith,
1991). Ethnic groups are imagined communities because, contra the
primordialists, they must be larger than a face-to-face gemeinschaft.
Cultural markers, like language, religion, customs and phenotype (or ‘race’)
are used by ethnies to demarcate their boundaries, thus ethnic groups need
to possess at least one (but no more than one) diacritical marker. Dominant
ethnic groups are ethnies that are dominant within a particular nation state
or sub-state nation (i.e. Japanese in Japan, Scots Protestants in Scotland).
Race, on the other hand, refers to communities or categories marked out by
phenotypical differences. This holds despite widespread disagreement over
where racial boundaries lie. Racial categories can exist within an ethnic
group, i.e. skin-colour differences within the Hindu (caste), Italian
(North–South) or Jewish (Ashkenazi–Mizrahim) ethnies; or they can
transcend ethnic groups (i.e. ‘whites’ in Europe, North America and else-
where). This is not to reify these genetically problematic categories, but
merely to acknowledge their importance to the actors that apprehend
them.1 Meanwhile, nations are integrated, modern communities of territory
and history that have political aspirations. States, by contrast, are political
units that have a monopoly on the use of force within their particular
bounded territory.
White Studies
The origin of White Studies, as David Roediger notes, lies in the pre-Civil
Rights period in the perceptive analyses of African-American writers such
as W.E.B. DuBois and James Baldwin. Developing from roots in critical
race theory in the 1970s, and drawing upon the insights of these earlier
African-American scholars, White Studies addressed an often-neglected
aspect of American ethnic and race relations: the majority group (Roediger,
1991; Delgado and Stefancic, 1997). As Ashley Doane astutely put it, the
ethnic and racial identity of the dominant group remained ‘hidden’ and
dominant group members were able to set the academic agenda, which
focused on the study of what they deemed strange, problematic or exotic.
Nowhere was the equation of ‘ethnic’ with ‘minority’ clearer than in the title
of Donald Ramsey Young’s American Minority Peoples (1932) (Doane,
1997; Doane, 2003: 7).
Work based on the White Studies approach spans not only theory,
literary and cultural studies, but also law and citizenship (Haney-Lopez,
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1996; Smith, 1997), history (Roediger, 1991, 1994), anthropology (Gallagher,
2003), sociology (Doane and Bonilla-Silva, 2003) and political science
(Perea, 1997). A number of points of unity are apparent. First, a focus on
the previously neglected contours of the majority white group. Second, a
treatment of the American past that emphasizes the oppression experi-
enced by those deemed to be ‘non-white’ rather than the myth of American
universalism. Third, a shared constructivist approach to white identity that
focuses on shifts in the definition of whiteness across time and place. Fourth,
a belief in white exceptionalism: namely, in the idea of whiteness as a politi-
cally motivated hegemonic ideology that is independent of normal
processes of collective identification. Finally, an elision of the racial ‘white’
and ethnic ‘WASP’ (white Anglo-Saxon Protestant) categories that are seen
as coterminous elements of an evolving racial power structure. These
principles inform a politics of deconstruction that seeks to expose the
constructed foundations of white hegemony in the United States. A corol-
lary of this is that the whiteness perspective can help to expose and resist
policies of liberal neutrality that might undermine support for collective
rights policies such as affirmative action and bilingual education. Though
White Studies has focused on the American case, this discourse is increas-
ingly making its presence felt outside the American context, as is evident in
the work of British writers such as Alistair Bonnett and Stuart Hall
(Bonnett, 2000).
THE AMERICAN CONTEXT
In order to properly evaluate the claims of White Studies scholars, we need
to begin with the American context. There is no question that discussion of
the majority group was a major lacuna in American discussions of race and
ethnicity. The focus on minorities partly stemmed from Eurocentric
constructions of the immigrant or non-white ‘other’ as a social problem. It
partly arose because the dominant WASP group could not see itself as
‘ethnic’ since it viewed the nation as coterminous with its own identity.
However, another major reason for the ‘hiding’ of dominant group identity
was an ideological insistence among the post-war ancestors of today’s
neoconservatives: the ‘consensus’ historians and intellectuals. They believed
that the United States was, unlike European nations, an exceptional
‘universal’ nation that had never had an ethnic core (Lipset, 1968). In fact,
as White Studies scholars correctly point out, there was an ethnic/racial
component to the American nation based on white Anglo-Protestant
superiority and the need to assimilate immigrants along anglo-conformist
lines. However, I will argue that this process is more accurately described
as ethnic rather than racial.
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The role of boundary construction
Another commonplace of White Studies writing is the idea that various
European ethnic groups ‘became’ white, partly by accepting the racialized
social structure of American society in which non-Caucasians were
excluded. The Irish Catholics are cited as the classic example of this. Noel
Ignatiev and David Roediger (among others) claim that the Irish ‘became’
white by arguing for their rights as whites (rather than as Americans) and
that this collusion became manifest in major left-wing institutions such as
the American Federation of Labour and the Democratic Party (Roediger,
1991; Ignatiev, 1995). Roediger and others certainly make a convincing case
that American society became more inclusive of the Irish after the Civil
War, whilst maintaining rigid segregation along racial lines, but does it really
make sense to speak of the Irish ‘becoming white’?
I would argue that this is an example of where scholars need to distance
themselves from their subjects’ colloquial terminology. The term ‘white’ was
occasionally used to differentiate non-WASP (or ‘new’) European
immigrants from established groups, and some European immigrants, such
as the Italians in Louisiana, did experience a withdrawal of civil rights
(Roediger and Barrett, 2002). ‘White’ was also occasionally used by
dominant group members to refer to themselves. Yet for the most part, it
was dominant WASP ethnicity that counted. ‘White’ was one of many
different colloquial names for the dominant ethnic group, most often used
in the south, where there were few white ethnics to problematize the
white/WASP distinction. For instance, terms like ‘American’, ‘old
American’, ‘native American’, ‘Yankee’ or ‘Protestant’ were at least as
common as ‘white’ – especially north of the Mason and Dixon line where
there were fewer blacks and more white ethnics. This emerges in
community studies such as Yankee City (Warner and Lunt, 1941) or the
Lynds’ Middletown (Lynd and Lynd, 1929). In Herman Lantz’s account of
a 1950s coal community (presumably in Ohio or Pennsylvania), a ‘native’
Protestant woman lamented:
I don’t think that parents . . . care for their children marrying foreigners, but
they can’t do much about it . . . there is more intermarriage between the natives
and foreigners today than there was in the olden time. You see, today there
soon won’t be any true American because they marry up with these foreigners.
(Lantz, 1958: 57–8, emphasis added)
A broader sense of ‘Caucasian’ whiteness did exist among a majority of
Americans, but only as a secondary identity. It did not stir the imagination
as strongly as ethnicity, though it mattered greatly when it came to social
interaction, citizenship and civil rights. The important point to take from
this is the semantics of the term ‘white.’ It could refer to major phenotypical
distinctions, i.e. the ‘Caucasian’ racial group, or it could be used as one of a
number of terms for the dominant ethnic group. In both cases, there was a
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psychic and material payoff to being included as ‘white.’ Yet the two usages
never blended into one in the popular mind, and their conflation by scholars
working in the White Studies mode is a misrepresentation of the historical
record. Thus the term ‘white’ meant something quite rigid when applied to
the Chinese in California in 1882 or southern blacks in the 1920s. By
contrast, Benjamin Franklin’s exegesis on the ‘tawny’ Germans in the 1750s
or talk of the non-whiteness of southern and eastern Europeans around
1900 lacked the same degree of concreteness and social combustibility.
After all, if whiteness is a mere construct, why didn’t white Anglo-
Protestants ‘construct’ black Anglo-Protestants as ‘American’ in order to
mould an anti-Catholic alliance (the pre-World War II Republican Party
notwithstanding)? Certainly the Catholic population was a large and
growing force, hence much more threatening to WASP power than the
African-Americans, and so it would have made more sense for white
Protestants to join forces with a group untainted by ‘Popery’. The answer,
surely, is that socially ‘real’ limits to identity construction were placed on
WASPs by the way we process colour impressions and by pre-existing racial
identities (however weak). These were more powerful than religious bonds
in the American case, which meant that white ethnics would always have
greater mobility than even long-resident non-whites. This is true in many
societies, but not in every society, as Donald Horowitz makes clear when
commenting on how the Islam–Christian ethnic divide overpowers the
racial divide between white and black Moors in Mauretania2 (Horowitz,
1985).
An overly constructivist interpretation of whiteness places a great deal
of emphasis on shifts in boundaries, hence White Studies scholars claim that
the Irish became white after the 1860s when the Democratic party courted
them as part of the class of free white labourers (Roediger, 1991: 170). But
why is the 1860s such a turning point? Irish Catholics were greatly over-
represented in the bottom rungs of society and in the prison population well
into the 20th-century. So much so that they earned a special mention in the
eugenics-inspired 1911 Dillingham Commission report (King, 2000), Their
religion was deemed a threat to the Republic until the late 1920s and they
had no hope of joining the WASP elite based in the eastern universities,
government and business (Baltzell, 1964). Prohibition and Klan revival
reinforced their second-class status and, even in 1928, there was little chance
of an Irish-Catholic such as Al Smith reaching the nation’s highest office.
Only with McCarthyism and Kennedy’s election in 1960, as well as the social
changes of the 1960s could an Irishman represent the all-American type.
Even then, Irish actors such as John Wayne had to adopt WASP surnames
to serve as ‘all-American’ archetypes.
In this sense, we need to interrogate the obsessive focus on boundaries
(the spatial dimension of ethnicity) at the expense of collective narratives
and iconography (the temporal dimension of ethnicity). Could it not be said
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that the Irish only really became ‘white’ after 1960 or 1965? Alternatively,
one could adopt a minimum definition of inclusion and go back to the
abolition of the penal laws in the late 18th-century as the defining moment,
if Catholic voting and citizenship are the keys to ‘whiteness’. This highlights
the multilevel nature of social inclusion, and the need for a more nuanced
approach to questions of exclusion/inclusion.
What actually happened is that the Irish, who were always considered
part of the broader ‘white’ race (even if poor cousins or ‘white
chimpanzees’), became equal and this was occasionally expressed using the
term ‘white’. This exposes the slipperiness of the ‘white’ concept, which
alters its meaning according to the disparate ideas expressed by the various
historical actors who utter this colloquialism. Surely scholars need to take
a critical step back and differentiate its ‘racial’ and ‘ethnic’ meanings.
The previous discussion focused on what I believe are some of the
limitations of an excessively constructivist, boundary-focused approach and
the semantic conflation of two very different uses of the term ‘white.’ This
raises the question of whether whiteness is malleable material in the hands
of ideologues. In much of the literature on whiteness, we get the sense that
whiteness is a hegemonic signifier with no relationship to the signified
referent of white identity. This reflects some of the tenets of discourse
analysis, which emphasizes the ways in which discursive strategies pave the
way for rule by consent (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985; Fairclough, 1989: 34).
This strategy opens the way for the claim that whiteness can be abolished
(Roediger, 1991; Ignatiev, 1995). If white Americans could only understand
that they are wearing the Emperor’s New Clothes, they would wake up from
their hegemonic stupor.
Notice that the White Studies argument turns on the notion that white-
ness is a free-floating text. If only things were so simple. Here we need to
return to a bit of critical reality: people’s racial distinctions are real, even if
there is little genetic basis to them. Just as people see discrete colours of
the physical rainbow despite an electromagnetic continuum, we need to
accept that they see colours (albeit with fuzzy boundaries) in the human
rainbow despite a genetic continuum (Dawkins, 2004). This, much more
than legal-technical distinctions, constitutes the social ‘reality’ of race. My
ethnic background includes a quarter Chinese and a quarter Latin
American, but I pass as white in both Europe and North America. Some of
my cousins, with the same mixture, do not pass as white on either continent.
What is happening is that people’s pre-conscious ‘auto-focus’ tunes me in
as white and my cousins as non-white.
Certainly matters might be different if White-Asian-Latinos were
hegemonically scripted as ‘non-white’, but this kind of legal-technical detail
has only occasionally mattered. We know that some individuals who
‘appeared’ white but had African ancestry were disenfranchised on the
basis of the ‘one drop rule’ in certain southern states (Haney-Lopez, 1996).
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But many white southerners have African ancestry and the vast majority
successfully hid this through most of American history. In effect, the sting
of non-whiteness (notably in the realm of politico-economic rights) largely
applied to those who could not pass as phenotypically ‘white’.
The same is true in cases outside the United States: Roediger may be
right that Malcolm X may have been considered ‘white’ in the West African
context, but it is a much bigger claim to say that West Africans did not
physically distinguish between Malcolm X and George Wallace. We see this
today in the attitude of the Nigerian government toward the light-skinned
Colin Powell, whose views they disagree with, but whom they consider to
be part of their wider racial group in a way that Donald Rumsfeld is not.
Meanwhile, in South Africa under apartheid, Japanese businessmen may
have been granted a ‘white’ designation on their identity cards, but this
classification must surely be kept distinct from wider social meanings of the
term ‘white’.
This is not to deny some role for social construction when it comes to
racial identity: those who are physically ‘in-between’ are to some extent up
for grabs and can be excluded by the dominant group, but even here, a
distinction is often made between the ‘in-betweens’ (i.e. South Italians) and
the definite ‘other’ (i.e. black) racial group. Even if there were no sub-
conscious basis for racial distinctions, we would still need to account for the
historical power of racial collective representations. For instance, statues,
film, portraits and photos all encode white iconic elements. To use
Durkheimian terminology, these collective representations create a path-
dependent ‘social fact’ – independent of power considerations – that is tied
to white identity and not easily dislodged. This flags up some of the
limitations of the boundary approach favoured by White Studies
scholars, whereby boundaries shift rapidly in response to changing power
constellations.
Whiteness as ideology
Is the white American myth-symbol complex an ideology? Only if we define
ideology so broadly as to include all human cultural constructions and to
thereby lose its lexical potency. Certainly, I would argue that narratives of
both WASP dominant ethnicity and the more diffuse ‘white’ racial identity
are analytically distinct from universalist ideologies of scientific racism –
though the latter influenced the former from the late 19th-century until the
mid-20th century (longer in the deep south). A lot of the argument turns
on whether a Foucauldian or Gramscian logic operates, whereby an instru-
mental motive underlies white social constructions. Considerations of
wealth, power and prestige are certainly important when it comes to
explaining ethnic leadership or people’s choice of identity. No doubt these
motives made the choice of whiteness an easy one for the antebellum Irish.
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However, people’s identities also stem from romantic and traditional
considerations (Smith, 1981; Ozkirimli, 2000). Cultural-historical traditions
are predominantly anchored to non-instrumental motives. Leaders of such
identity movements are often motivated by a yearning for authenticity,
meaning or solidarity during periods of modern social upheaval. Their
identity constructions are constrained both by a group’s fund of available
myths, symbols and memories and by the degree to which their construc-
tions resonate with their target populations. Such resonance is only likely
to be achieved when leaders appeal to elements within the repository of
collective representations that have been handed down, in Durkheimian
fashion, from generation to generation. In the American case, romantic
currents of thought that glorified the pioneer, yeoman farmer and the
symbols of rural America (including the Protestant church and school-
house) were arguably central to WASP ethnonationalism (Smith, 1950).
The picture for the wider white American racial group is less clear.
Traditions of how Europeans differed from the non-‘white’ world were
hazier and even non-existent for some peasant immigrants. Therefore, the
mass-cultural material that united all European-origin groups together as
‘whites’ (vaudeville, blackface, dime novels, film) leaned more heavily on
negative stereotypes of the ‘other’ than in the WASP case, where romantic
nationalist ideals were important. Instrumental considerations also bulked
larger for white ethnics, who had a great deal to gain from their ‘associate
membership’ in white America. Yet this does not invalidate the fact that
whiteness was a real identity as well as a flag of convenience. There already
existed a tradition of (pan-ethnic) white American identity that has grown
more coherent over the past two generations through inter-faith marriage,
‘white flight’, cultural differentiation and growing racial diversity. Ideology
per se was never the whole story and is less important for whiteness today
than ever before.
White exceptionalism
This points to a major inconsistency in the White Studies approach: its belief
in white exceptionalism. Other racial categories are relatively authentic, but
WASP and white are not; other groups are ‘cultural’, but WASPs or whites
are culturally barren; other groups look to identity politics for cultural-
historical reasons, but WASPs and whites do so for purely instrumental
considerations. In asserting these patterns, White Studies scholars are
perpetuating the very myth of white exceptionalism that led to the ‘hiding’
of white identity in the first place! This myth echoes the ancient Greek
usage of the term ethnos or barbaroi whereby only cultural outsiders were
considered ‘ethnic.’ This scholarly mindset has a very long pedigree in the
United States. It explains why the term ‘WASP’ had to be coined by a
Jewish-American outsider like Saul Bellow in the 1950s.
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We should not deify white people. In the annals of human history, the
strong politico-economic performance of light-skinned peoples is short,
dating from no earlier than 1600. When whites lose their superior politico-
economic position in the world, they will no longer receive reverential treat-
ment in the developing world and will not be accorded the same status
within western societies. Already, white Protestants in the United States are
not viewed the same way they were only 50 years ago, and are occasionally
seen as more ‘backward’ than the relatively urbanized, northern and
successful white Catholics and Jews. This pattern is a harbinger of the
future, when the urban American elite will be more racially hybrid than the
traditionalist, economically precarious inhabitants of small-town and
provincial America.
I am not joining the Polyanna-ish chorus of those who see an end to race
in America (Roediger, 2002). Even with a hybridized elite, those with dark
skins will face an uphill struggle to gain equality in their society. But power
and wealth will become increasingly divorced from narratives of white
authenticity, and we may well see a struggle between the purveyors of white
nationalism (with their provincial base) and the modern, hybrid elite of the
cities. Even the digestion of all white ethnics is problematic. Here I note
that extremist groups like the Ku Klux Klan have opened their gates to
southern and eastern European groups, once derided as ‘beaten breeds’, but
have not embraced even the blondest of Jews. As a result, I would contest
the increasingly popular notion that the boundaries of whiteness will easily
expand to include lighter-skinned Hispanics and Asians (Alba, 1990: 312;
Gans, 1994: 588–9).
Racial whiteness and wasp ethnicity
At this point, we need to specify the difference between the white racial
category, which is a pan-ethnic group, and the dominant WASP ethnic
group, with its frontier narrative and rural-Protestant symbolism. These two
are elided by White Studies scholars, but must be kept distinct. WASP
ethnicity was a much richer construct and was more central to American
national identity than the white racial category. Whiteness has well-defined
boundaries, but is much more symbolically confused and opaque than
WASPness. It lacks the ‘native’ authenticity that WASPness possessed,
which makes its connection to nationalism problematic. Immigration led
WASPs to employ both immigration restriction and anglo-conformity to
retain ethnic boundaries. This was partially successful, but got stuck when
Catholics and Jews failed to adopt the Protestant faith in sufficient numbers.
WASPs might have contented themselves with a slower rate of assimilation
and the maintenance of dominant minority status from the 1950s onward,
but they did not.
Why? The reasons for the decline of the WASP had little to do with an
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instrumental expansion of dominant group boundaries in the face of a
threat from peoples of colour. The latter were too weak to pose any real
challenge to WASP hegemony in the 1950s and early 1960s. Instead, the
primary dynamic of change was liberalism: anti-Catholicism and anti-
Semitism waned during the mid-20th-century while American society
became increasingly ‘loose-bounded’ (Bellah and Greenspahn, 1987). The
trans-sectarian process that swept diverse American cities also affected
homogenous locales from Oregon to the northwest of England. Elsewhere,
I argue that when the WASPs began to lose their hegemony in the mid-
20th-century, all minorities – religious and racial – improved their politico-
economic position (Kaufmann, 2004a). There was no point at which
reformers argued, ‘Let us relax our religious boundaries while leaving racial
lines in place.’
White identity always existed as a pan-ethnic category that mattered
greatly for the boundaries of exclusion at the most basic levels of partici-
pation (labour, voting) in the United States. This racial identity did not,
however, define the nation or determine who could lead, represent or
narrate the nation – this being the preserve of the dominant WASP ethnic
group. With a few exceptions, C. Wright Mills and Digby Baltzell were
correct that the American power elite, presidents, congressmen, captains of
industry, military and academic leaders, were WASP well into the 1950s
(Mills, 1956; Baltzell, 1964). The decline of the WASP sparked a transitional
period in which the white pan-ethnic group gained in importance.
Liberalism, the subsequent reality of inter-ethnic marriage and urbaniza-
tion started this shift, and the rise in the power and demographic strength
of non-Europeans reinforced it. Even so, the coincidence of white identity
with liberalism was merely momentary. 1960s liberalism leveled inter-faith
barriers among whites, but simultaneously helped transcend the colour line
that defined white identity, leading to a sharp rise in inter-racial marriage.
This time, it is less clear that white identity will tango with liberalism.
White identity could embrace Catholics and Jews because these people fit
in with whites’ gestalt-psychological colour perceptions and their pre-
existing white collective representations. Catholics and Jews were already
nominal members of the white racial group in the days of anti-Catholicism
and anti-Semitism, but Asians and most Hispanics are not even associate
whites. A downplaying of religious identity and change of surname could
even create an ‘all-American’ WASP out of a Catholic such as Rita
Hayworth or Jew such as Kirk Douglas. This is unthinkable for an Asian or
most Hispanics. On the other hand, Hayworth and Douglas’s co-ethnics
were not part of the dominant WASP ethnic group and, in the pre-1970
period, we need to distinguish between general white racial membership
and the more exclusive and powerful WASP dominant ethnicity.
White exceptionalists have elided the distinction between racial white-
ness and ethnic WASPness for some time. Consider the excellent work of
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Thomas Gossett. This historian, like most of his colleagues in the 1950s and
early 1960s, assumed that narratives of Anglo-Saxon origin and superiority
in the United States were not ethnic but ‘racial’3 (Gossett, 1963). But are
myths of genealogical origin ‘racial’? Myths of origin and narratives of
uniqueness define ethnic groups. Greeks look back to their classical and
Byzantine ancestors, Turks to their central Asian forebears, Ukrainians to
the Cossacks, Arabs to the Bedouins, Zulus to Shaka’s original clan, the
French invoke the Gauls and Franks, and Chinese hark back to the Chin
and Han dynasties. All assert the positive qualities of their (supposed)
ancestors. What is the difference between these constructions and 19th-
century Anglo-Americans tracing their ancestry to supposedly superior,
westward-wandering Anglo-Saxons? Only a patronising or parochial view
of other ethnic groups could lead to Gossett’s belief that, while others were
exotically ethnic, WASPs were engaging in a racial power game. No, when
we speak of Anglo-Protestant and now ‘white’ identity, we are not dealing
with exceptional gods, but ordinary mortals who see the world as others do
and have the same needs (and weaknesses).
THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT
The previous discussion has touched mainly on criticisms of the White
Studies approach to American ethnic relations. In the process, I have
spoken of the need to distinguish race from ethnicity, and to balance a
constructivist approach based on shifting boundaries with a historicist
approach that takes mytho-symbolic path-dependence more seriously.
Limitations of time and place
In this section, I argue that the White Studies approach has developed a
number of limitations that derive from its American focus and methodo-
logical assumptions. The first concerns a parochialism in time, illustrated by
White Studies’ focus on the recent past of white power, which extends
through to the post-civil rights context. This gives rise to a belief in white
omnipotence when in fact a much simpler explanation is that we are living
through a (temporary) period of light-skinned civilizational success that
produces a ‘psychic wage’ for whites. Already, the once unassailable WASPs
have given way to non-denominational ‘whites’ in the American power
structure, and the racial hybrids are coming up behind them. When civiliz-
ation was centred around the Mediterranean, China and India, light-
skinned people were often enslaved and viewed as barbarians. This is why
the word ‘slave’ is derived from the Slavs who were the source of slaves in
the Byzantine and the Ottoman empire. Alistair Bonnett and others are
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correct to point out that racial pseudo-science led to a hardening of racial
boundaries, but this edifice was not constructed ex nihilo. It was rooted in
a growing racial self-awareness that was bolstered by the strong politico-
economic performance of north-western Europe. In the broad span of
historical time, a few centuries is not much. Civilizations rise and fall and
the dominance of light-skinned peoples is but one act in the long drama of
human history. The loss of white prestige will make pretensions of white
supremacy sound as hollow as ideas of Islamic superiority do today.
Perhaps more important than the limited time horizon of White Studies
is its restricted appreciation of how ethnic dynamics operate outside the
United States. This leads to an over-specification of the role of race in ethnic
conflict and thereby hinders the applicability of ideas of whiteness outside
the American context. One of the hallmarks of White Studies’ thinking is
its belief that the advantageous politico-economic position of whites in the
United States is the result of a hegemonic ideology of white racism. No one
can dispute the fact that scientific racism was a force in shaping American
immigration policy in the 1920s – a policy that was not reformed until 1965.
But was phrenology and eugenics central or was pseudo-science simply a
legitimating device used by an anxious WASP ethnie that felt itself under
siege from non-WASP immigrants? ‘The nobility and dedication of the
[racial] scientists ought not to obscure their human frailty’, wrote the great
American ethnic historian Oscar Handlin. ‘Beyond the impressive array of
tables and charts, set apart by the elaborate formality of their procedures,
were men groping for an explanation of their condition’ (Handlin, 1957:
111–12).
Here a glance outside the American context can yield a great deal of
insight. The experience of Australia, Canada and Scotland suggests that
racial concerns were secondary to ethnic considerations. Canada and
Australia did bar non-white immigrants, but their ethnonationalists were
mostly concerned with non-British immigrants (Palmer, 1975). In Scotland,
a famous report from the Church of Scotland in the mid-1930s warned of
the ‘menace to the Scottish race’ of continued Irish immigration. However,
the term ‘race’ was a cover for ethnic and sectarian anxiety, used because
scientific racism was deemed a more acceptable argument for restriction
than religious bigotry (Bruce et al., 2004). Today, far-right parties in Europe
from Flanders (Vlaams Blok) to France (Front National), Holland (Pim
Fortuyn List) to Austria (Freedom Party) and most countries in between
are primarily driven by the immigration restriction issue. Can ‘whiteness’
help us in understanding these processes?
I am skeptical. Most immigration-restriction politics is less concerned
with instrumental politics or demonic visions of the ‘other’ than with main-
taining the congruence of a particular ethnie and ‘its’ nation state. This has
its roots in the Herderian, völkish conception of the nation which has only
a tenuous connection to modern scientific racism. Most nations were
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constructed on the basis of a pre-modern ethnic core that provided the
foundation myths, emblems and symbolic boundaries for the modern nation
state. (Smith, 1986). In several other cases, such as the United States
(WASP), Guyana (Creole) and Mexico (Mestizo), the dominant ethnic
group formed after political independence (or revolution). Thus ethnicity
and nation become ontologically and organically connected. In the minds
of ethnonationalists, newcomers bring different cultural markers that need
to be assimilated or rejected in order to remove the dissonance between
ethnic group and nation.
Race or ethnicity?
Race only becomes central to ethnic conflict in specific cases, and recent
large-scale comparative research shows that phenotypical differences are
much less powerful than linguistic ones in explaining ethnic violence
(Vanhanen, 2004). This is because most neighbouring ethnic groups look
like each other. As noted at the outset, ethnic groups, by definition, require
at least one diacritical marker to distinguish them from their neighbours.
Race can serve as a marker of ethnicity, but will only do so in cases where
groups come together as a consequence of long-distance migration (i.e.
Mauritius, United States) or where such groups abut a major phenotypical
boundary (e.g. the Himalayas or southern Sahara).
In cases where there are phenotypical differences, these may form
central features of ethnic differentiation and, where one group dominates,
they will tend to assert the superiority of their ‘race’. Tutsi dominance over
Hutu in Rwanda and Burundi; Arab dominance over Africans in Sudan,
Chad or pre-1974 Zanzibar; Japanese dominance over the Ainu in
Hokkaido: these are all instances of dominant ethnicity based on racial
distinctions. The underlying sources of these ‘racial’ conflicts have to do
with local ethnic dynamics rather than the broad racial classifications of
racist ideologues. Certainly ‘whiteness’ plays no role.
In the western hemisphere, ideology has been more important in affect-
ing the treatment of particular visible minorities (in some cases majorities)
such as the Native Indians and Africans. This is because lines of culture and
‘race’ often cross, leading to racial divisions within cultures (i.e. black and
white Brazilians) and transnational racial groups (i.e. Native Indians
throughout Latin America). Meanwhile, the indigenousness of the Native
Indians complicated a simple ‘nativist’ response to minorities on the part of
white criollo dominant groups. This means that there is more scope for
broader racial studies approaches in the western hemisphere, about which
I shall say more later. Even so, once the new states of the Americas were
set up, criollo settler dominant ethnies formed and could respond in
‘nativist’ ethnic terms to new immigrants who threatened the imagined
congruence of dominant ethnic group and nation.
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In the United States, we see this in the case of the Native American/
Know-Nothing Party of the 1840s–60s and the multi-million member Ku
Klux Klan of the 1920s (both were primarily northern, anti-Catholic move-
ments). These shared a concern with the decline of the WASP dominant
ethnic group. They were more concerned with the rise of Catholic power
than they were with the exoticism of the ‘new’ immigrants from southern
and eastern Europe or the ‘old’ racial minorities. Defending WASP
America against the polyglot cities was the primary concern of congres-
sional immigration restrictionists and was illustrated by the fact that the
1924 Johnson-Reed Act, which privileged racial ‘Nordics’ (including Irish
and Germans), was superseded by pro-WASP legislation in 1929 that
allocated 50 percent of the quota to Britain and excoriated Irish and
German ethnic organizations as unpatriotic and self-seeking (Higham,
1988[1955]).
Likewise, in Canada, the primary concern of the dominant British-
Canadian group as late as the 1960s was to encourage British immigration
and discourage Catholic immigration. This was not because the Irish and
French were not considered ‘white’. It was because the dominant ethnic
group in the country wished to solidify its position. The same concerns
inform the Singapore government’s selective immigration policy, which
favours Chinese immigrants over Indians and Malays. In Vietnam and
Malaysia, ‘Native’ Vietnamese and Malay attitudes to the Chinese are
reversed, but for the same reason: dominant ethnicity.
Many postcolonial states are ethnically divided and internal migration
raises similar issues to those of international immigration. For example, in
Assam in north-eastern India, native Assamese express antipathy to
Bengali and other in-migrants who greatly outnumber them in their
homeland. In Northern Ireland, the formerly high fertility rate and
eastward migration of the Catholic community has been a major ingredient
in the Protestant ‘siege mentality’. Indeed, fear of being ‘swamped’ in one’s
homeland is not limited to Enoch Powell or Margaret Thatcher: Philippine
Muslims, Melanesian Fijians, Lebanese Christians, native-born South
African blacks and numerous others express similar fears. This leads to an
obsession with the census and with symbolic conflicts such as which
language should be declared ‘official’ (Horowitz, 1985: ch. 4, 5). Both of
these concerns have clear resonance in the European and American
cases.
Another nation state that reflects the American experience is Jordan. As
with the United States’s present-day pan-ethnic ‘whites’, Jordan’s dominant
group is a pan-ethnic coalition of Transjordanian tribal groups, whose main
shared identity is that they are not Palestinian immigrants. They maintain
their hold on power by gerrymandering electoral boundaries and invoking
their indigenous, ‘native’ rights as the dominant ethnic group. Throughout
the Persian Gulf, immigrants who are not members of the dominant
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tribal-Arab ethnic groups face restrictive citizenship regimes – not because
of their appearance or because they are irrationally feared, but because they
are not part of the dominant ethnic group that views the nation as ‘its’
organic possession.
In Europe and North America, the physical appearance of most
immigrants differs from that of the dominant ethnic group, but not always.
In Austria, ‘invisible’ East European immigrants are the main irritant for
ethnonationalists. Likewise in Greece and Italy, where one would be hard-
pressed to racially distinguish an Albanian immigrant. I am not convinced
that the dynamic behind these cases differs greatly from cases where
immigrant and ‘native’ look different. I am also unconvinced that such cases
differ from the postcolonial cases described above. Pejorative stereotypes
and racist fantasies can exacerbate tensions, but these conflicts have more
to do with the desire of dominant ethnic groups to render ethnic and
national boundaries congruent through immigration restriction or cultural
assimilation.
It is important to distinguish between raw antagonism based on simple
ethnic conflict and situations where historically charged stereotypes or
Freud’s ‘narcissism of minor differences’ (e.g. Albanians in Greece, Jews in
pre-war Europe) play a role (Goldhagen, 1996). Demeaning stereotypes of
the Albanians in Greece, for example, add a negative charge to ethnic
relations between the two groups. These stereotypes have historical roots
and do not attach with the same force to North African immigrants. Never-
theless, the basic issue for ethnic Greeks in Greece is a slippage in the
congruence of ethnie and nation. Furthermore, neither the ethnic conflict
nor the ethnic stereotypes have much to do with Greek ideas of ‘whiteness’.
On the whole, therefore, a whiteness approach is too inflexible and
parochial to allow us to understand the mechanisms that are driving anti-
immigrant and anti-multicultural policies in the West. Following the analyti-
cal path laid by White Studies will, in the end, result in a partial and
decontextualized explanation that inflates the importance of racial markers,
racial power systems, racial fears of the ‘other’ and racial ideologies.
Instead, I favour a more concerted attempt to interrogate the ethnic groups
that claim national legitimacy and authenticity.4 This means that greater
attention must be paid to mapping the contours of dominant ethnicity
within nations (Kaufmann, 2004b).
The dominant ethnicity paradigm
The dominant ethnicity approach recognizes that dominant ethnic groups
are intimately linked to nations through shared foundation myths, boundary
symbols and collective memories. This forms a centrepiece of Anthony
Smith’s work on the ethnic origins of nations, but Smith fails to specify what
happens when the modern nation takes over from its pre-modern ethnie
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(Kaufmann and Zimmer, 2004). Dominant ethnies do not simply die, but
live in the shadow of the nation state they created. We need to know more
about how dominant ethnic groups such as the Japanese in Japan, French
in France or pure laine Quebecois in Quebec narrate their ethnic identities,
which have until recently been inseparable from their national identities.
This is the research agenda that lay behind my recent edited collection on
this topic (Kaufmann, 2004b).
Smith’s concept of the ‘core ethnie’ (1986) and later, ‘dominant ethnie’
(1991) is one starting point for analysis that concentrates on the ethnicity in
dominant ethnicity, i.e. the cultural and ontological aspects of dominant
ethnicity. A second heuristic emerges in the literature arising from
Schermerhorn’s (1970) more politico-demographic approach, which distin-
guishes between dominant majorities and minorities. This more explicitly
examines the dominant aspect of dominant ethnicity. Donald Horowitz
picks up on this thread when discussing ethnic power systems, especially in
the postcolonial context (Horowitz, 1985).
Key to this discussion, therefore, are two ideas: indigenousness and
power. ‘Native’ indigenousness provides the legitimating concept that aligns
ethnicity with territory. Meanwhile, raw political power enables an ethnic
group to achieve dominance within a multiethnic state. The right combi-
nation of both is necessary for a group to emerge as incontestably
dominant. Thus in Guyana, the Creolized Africans emerged as the
dominant ethnie because they could claim to be more ‘native’ than Asian
Indians (descendants of indentured labourers who arrived after them) or
European settlers. Meanwhile, their more rapid absorption into the culture
of the colonists favoured them in the colonial power structure, while the
more ‘indigenous’ Caribbean Indians did not have enough political power
to contest Creole dominance (St. Hilaire, 2001).
We need to comprehend dominant ethnicity because it is increasing in
importance in our time. This is so for two main reasons. First, the increase
in global migration and cultural exchange, together with the rise of liberal-
cosmopolitan norms among university-educated populations, is driving an
ever-growing wedge between dominant ethnic groups and ‘their’ nations in
the West. Nations – even if minorities like the Scots or Catalans – speak in
terms of an inclusive, ‘civic’ nationalism rather than ethnonationalism. This
means that nations are being separated from dominant ethnic groups, which
are increasingly aware that their corporate existence is distinct from that of
the state. This raises real identity problems that can express themselves in
immigration restrictionist and anti-multicultural politics.
Second, outside the West, dominant ethnicity is increasingly salient
because the end of the Cold War has prompted a collapse of postcolonial
state unity. Nehru’s India, Nyerere’s Tanzania, Nkrumah’s Ghana and Tito’s
Yugoslavia have succumbed to ethnic politics. Dominant ethnic groups such
as the Hindus of India, Akan in Ghana or Serbs of the former Yugoslavia
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face internal ethnic challenges while dominant ethnic parties increasingly
appeal to a narrow ethnic base.
In the West, the growing divergence between dominant ethnies and
‘their’ ever more civic nations has heightened ethnic self-awareness among
dominant groups such as the English in Britain, Portuguese in Portugal or
‘Anglo-Celts’ in Australia (Johnson, 2002). They increasingly realize that
they are not the nation, and that the ‘white’ box (without prefix or suffix)
on equal opportunities monitoring forms is a living, sub-state ethnic
category. Some dominant ethnic groups may refer to themselves as ‘white’,
or as having only a national (non-ethnic) identity, but we should treat such
statements with caution. Loose talk of the English in Wales or Scotland as
‘white settlers’ or Protestant migration within Northern Ireland as ‘white
flight’ needs to be similarly interrogated.
We need to probe deeper and understand why dominant ethnies behave
as they do. Dominant ethnic groups often face the choice of an expansive
or a restrictive ethnic strategy. An expansive strategy opts for power over
culture/identity. For example, the Czarist-Soviet and Ottoman empires
pursued territorial aggrandisement at the expense of their ethnic particu-
larity – something that numerous Russian Slavophile intellectuals bewailed
(Figes, 2001). This strategy had material benefits for the Russian and
Turkish ethnic elites who ran these empires, but posed a threat to the
integrity of the dominant ethnic group by fraying the vertical bonds
between the ethnic elite and masses. Conversely, a second option is
retrenchment, which maintains ethnic boundaries through immigration
restriction and cultural purification (as with the attempt by romantic
cultural nationalists to substitute invented words based on native roots for
foreign borrowings). A restrictive strategy such as little Englandism or little
Turkism often involves an inward-looking mode that foresakes growth (i.e.
Empire) for cultural particularity. A ‘third way’ is the one favoured by the
United States throughout much of its history: to maintain ethnic boundaries
through assimilation rather than restriction.
National territories are ethnic homelands, thus national decisions affect
dominant ethnic groups. Multiculturalism and civic nationalism may be
opposing political theories, but they share a common indifference to the
ethnie–nation link. Both relativize ethnicity and de-centre the dominant
ethnie, thereby threatening its political dominance and its ‘indigenous’
connection to the ethnic homeland. These processes also weaken the
dominant ethnie’s control over cultural and personnel flows into the
homeland. Finally, the cosmopolitan ethos of western liberal multiculturalism
has the potential to transgress and corrode ethnic boundaries through
large-scale inter-marriage. Taken at once, it spells disaster for ethnic domi-
nance, hence it is not surprising that dominant ethnic processes explain
most of the resistance to multiculturalism in the West. These processes are
more about ethnic anxieties than racial fears.
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Race is the principal marker that distinguishes dominant ethnics in the
West from recent immigrants, though both religion and language are also
important. In some cases (i.e. Greece), race is not even a marker of
difference. Moreover, race itself is not so significant: the potential mass
migration of East Europeans is almost as much of a concern to dominant
ethnonationalists as immigration from the developing world. No major
European dominant ethnic group will dissolve itself within a ‘white’ identity
as has occurred in the United States. This is not because East Europeans
are not considered ‘white’, but because they are not considered part of the
dominant ethnic group. Ideological discourses of racism and stereotypes of
the ‘other’ are certainly linked with social inequality, but they do not power
the anxieties that drive ‘Fortress Europe’. In short, dominant ethnic groups
do not fear the cultural difference of the ‘other’ so much as the foreigner’s
potential to disrupt a perceived ethno-territorial continuity.
THE ROLE OF RACIAL STUDIES
Where does this leave White Studies? Earlier, I argued that ethnicity cannot
explain everything. This is particularly true when studying intra-ethnic or
supra-ethnic conflict or when we are dealing with properties of societies
that are arrayed along a continuum, but still count. These characteristics
apply with force to race and status – which vary within societies but do not
always constitute clear boundaries for social action. In the tropics and sub-
tropics (Latin America, much of Africa, India and Southeast Asia), and even
within the western diasporas of peoples of tropical origin, light skin is
associated with higher social status, but does not neatly align with caste or
racial group boundaries. Meanwhile, ethnic origin myths go back to
European (i.e. Hindus),Turkic (i.e. Indian Muslims) or Semitic (i.e. Somalis,
Lemba) ancestors. This has real consequences for human behaviour:
population geneticists have recently demonstrated that higher castes in
India have a significantly more European genetic profile than lower castes
(Bamshad et al., 2001).
Why is this the case and what can be done about it? Pierre Van den
Berghe, in trying to explain the preference for light-skinned women across
a large sample of major civilizations, suggests that light skin is associated
with fertility since a woman’s skin lightens at the peak of the reproductive
cycle and darkens with age. On the other hand, the two exceptions in Van
den Berghe’s model, Moorish Spain and the 25th Nubian dynasty of
Egypt, show that social prestige may override the sociobiological impera-
tive (Van den Berghe and Frost, 1986). Also, it is unclear that preferences
in females automatically translate into a status system based on light
skin. The rise of western racism (over and above the prestige factor of
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light-skinned success post-1600) also has a role to play in elevating the
white ideal in our time and a White Studies approach can illuminate some
of these dynamics. This would need to involve more emphasis on the
political mechanisms whereby ideologies of whiteness are translated into
institutional rules. A racial studies perspective is also required in order to
make sense of pan-ethnic movements like Negritude, White Supremacy or
perhaps pan-Arabism, which are not easily encapsulated within ethnic
studies approaches.
CONCLUSION
This article argues that the concept of dominant ethnicity is a much more
useful tool than whiteness when it comes to understanding majority
responses to multiculturalism and immigration. I have pointed to what I
believe to be a number of serious omissions in the White Studies
approach, namely: (1) a constructivism that fails to recognize the cognitive
and social processes that underpin social ‘reality’; (2) an excessive
emphasis on ethnic boundaries and the scope for identity construction,
which underplays the importance of ethno-historical narratives and path-
dependency; (3) a tacit belief in white exceptionalism, which overempha-
sizes the ideological character of whiteness and deifies whites; (4) an
elision of the concepts of dominant ethnicity and race; and (5) a threefold
parochialism in terms of place, time horizon and the role of race in ethnic
studies. The first four problem areas afflict existing White Studies
approaches to American ethnic and race relations, while the latter casts
doubt on the external validity of the White Studies perspective beyond the
American case.
This does not mean that White Studies has led us down a blind alley.
White Studies shone a much-needed light on areas that were crying out
for examination. The empirical studies inspired by the whiteness approach
form a rich, well-researched and innovative body of work. The writing of
David Roediger is especially pioneering and is rooted in detailed analysis
and solidly researched labour and social history. My argument is only that
the time has come to place White Studies in its proper context. At a time
when dominant ethnicity is becoming an increasingly prevalent feature of
social and political life in all parts of the world, the White Studies
approach cannot take us much further. Moreover, its tendency to both
deify and castigate whites, combined with its more headline-grabbing
statements (i.e. ‘abolishing whiteness’) tarnishes the political aim of
eradicating the real ethnic and racial inequalities that exist in the present
day. In this sense, the politics of White Studies often seems at odds with
its methodology.
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Notes
1 Medical research suggests that racial and ethnic categories are not unimportant
as predictors of genetic disease, but that there is far more variation within than
between different ethnic and racial groups (Pearce at al., 2004). Dawkins adds
that genetic variation within humans that is attributable to ‘racial’ divisions
hovers at no more than 6–15 percent (Dawkins, 2004).
2 Likewise, one sometimes observes African or Native-Indian-Canadian
Orangemen on parade in Belfast. An Irish Catholic would hardly be accorded
similar status!
3 The elision of the two is clear in the shift of title between his PhD dissertation,
‘The Idea of Anglo-Saxon Superiority in American Thought, 1865–1915’ (1953),
and the subsequent monograph based on his thesis, Race, The History of an Idea
in America (1963).
4 Fragments of the whiteness canon allude to this, as with talk of the dominant
group’s ‘myth of exclusive possession.’
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